Cumplimiento en pago de contribuciones: autoridades fiscales versus religiosas en México

Luis Augusto Chávez Maza, Alexander Elbittar () and Fausto Hernandez-Trillo
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Luis Augusto Chávez Maza: CEDES/Benemérita Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Puebla

Estudios Económicos, 2015, vol. 30, issue 1, 51-74

Abstract: This paper studies fiscal correspondence and fiscal trust. Through an experimental design carried out in Oaxaca, Mexico it explores which authority, the religious or the civil one, is better at collecting contributions to finance common goods. Results suggest that fiscal correspondence is the main factor to explain better collection. That is, when the good is observable, people are more willing to pay the contribution.

Keywords: confianza fiscal; correspondencia fiscal; aportaciones voluntarias; experimentos en campo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H31 H44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:30:y:2015:i:1:p:51-74

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