Un enfoque de diseño de mercados para la selección de personal del Instituto Nacional Electoral en México

David Cantala () and Jaume Sempere

Estudios Económicos, 2015, vol. 30, issue 1, 75-92

Abstract: In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers' selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the existing procedure.

Keywords: Instituto Nacional Electoral; administración pública; matching; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:30:y:2015:i:1:p:75-92

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