The structure of political power and redistribution in economies with multiple governments

Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez, Ikuho Kochi () and Luis E. Gutiérrez Casas
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Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez: Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
Luis E. Gutiérrez Casas: Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez

Estudios Económicos, 2015, vol. 30, issue 2, 269-303

Abstract: For economies with multiple governments, the effort and effectiveness of public redistribution policies depend on the political structure of the federation. The central government determines the degree of redistribution and the interaction between the preferences and wages of voters controlling, respectively, the central and sub-national governments determine whether income redistribution can be an effective tool to redistribute welfare. In this paper, we identify conditions in which the interaction between the central government and sub-national governments lead to a Pareto superior allocation in the redistribution of income.

Keywords: redistribution; efficiency; federalism; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H21 H23 H30 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:30:y:2015:i:2:p:269-303

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