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Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation

Andrés Cendales and Jhon Mora

Estudios Económicos, 2015, vol. 30, issue 2, 305-339

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government.

Keywords: clientelism; poverty; political negotiation; precarious democracies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D31 D33 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:30:y:2015:i:2:p:305-339