Campaign contributions and local public goods in a federation

Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
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Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez: Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez

Estudios Económicos, 2018, vol. 33, issue 2, 283-311

Abstract: I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local governments do not provide Pareto efficient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters. For the economy with campaign contributions, LPGs with and without spillovers are Pareto efficient, and the system of local governments maximizes the gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences.

Keywords: local public goods; efficiency; externalities; federalism; elections and campaign contributions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H21 H23 H41 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:33:y:2018:i:2:p:283-311

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