A note on fair threats and promises/Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas

Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno-Okuno
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Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno-Okuno: Universidad de Guanajuato

Estudios Económicos, 2022, vol. 37, issue 1, 171-198

Abstract: With their Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) developed a solution concept that incorporates reciprocity in sequential games. A SRE evaluates the kindness or unkindness of a strategy based purely on the actions it prescribes at the equilibrium path. However, given that it is not the objective of the SRE to evaluate threats and promises, it does not consider the actions outside the equilibrium path, where threats and promises are included. This article develops a new solution concept, Fair Threat Equilibria, which main objective is to give more reasonable predictions when threats and promises are included.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Promises; Threats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C70 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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