An elementary transfers procedure for sharing the joint surplus in games with externalities/Un procedimiento elemental de transferencias para repartir el excedente conjunto en juegos con externalidades

Joss Erick Sánchez-Pérez
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Joss Erick Sánchez-Pérez: Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí

Estudios Económicos, 2023, vol. 38, issue 2, 317-332

Abstract: Sánchez-Pérez (2017, Theorem 3) presents an analytic characterization for all solutions for games with externalities that satisfy the axioms of linearity, symmetry, and efficiency. The main goal of this paper is to recast such formulation to a more intuitive interpretation. In particular, we are interested in an interpretation based on the idea of transfers among players.

Keywords: games with externalities; axiomatic solution; transfers procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C71 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:38:y:2023:i:2:p:317-332

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