Treating equals equally and unequals unequally in one-sided matching markets

David Cantala and Saul Mendoza-Palacios
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David Cantala: El Colegio de México
Saul Mendoza-Palacios: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas

Estudios Económicos, 2025, vol. 40, issue 1, 1-12

Abstract: We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally†(TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optimal transportation theory, to find a TEEUU assignment in the core whenever it exists- by searching a Pareto optimal assignment- and 2) conditions under which a TEEUU assignment in the core always exists.

JEL-codes: C61 C62 C78 D51 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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