The politics of intergovernmental transfers and local government deficits: Theory and evidence

Pablo Sanguinetti

Estudios Económicos, 1993, vol. 8, issue 1, 87-109

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we present a model of decentralized fiscal policy-making where a "coordination failure" problem arises. Second, we make an effort in order to empirically test this approach by developing an empirical investigation based on the recent experience of two countries: Argentina and Great Britain.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:8:y:1993:i:1:p:87-109

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