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Hysteresis of targeting civilians in armed conflicts

Uih Ran Lee ()
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Uih Ran Lee: University of Bradford, Bradford, UK

Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2015, vol. 10, issue 2, 31-40

Abstract: This article explores warring groups’ intentional targeting behavior against civilians, a strictly prohibited war strategy by international norms. Using dynamic panel regressions run on a comprehensive dataset of contemporary warfare which covers 22 years (1989-2010), I find that warring actors, both sovereign states and formally organized armed groups, behave systematically in terms of civilian targeting when they are involved in prolonged armed conflict (15-22 years). Warring actors’ lethal behavior against civilians tends to be intensified if targeting is repeated in prolonged armed conflict although this hysteresis effect persists only for one year. It is hypothesized that the mounting war cost of prolonged conflict inclines warring groups toward the presumably cheaper targeting of noncombatant civilians rather than battling combatant military or other armed personnel.

Keywords: Civilian targeting; prolonged armed conflict; civilian targeting index (CTI); hysteresis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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