The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory

Charles Anderton

Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2015, vol. 10, issue 2, 5-20

Abstract: A standard evolutionary game theory model is used to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a population that make it vulnerable to accepting the genocidal aims of political leaders. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, genocide architects can engineer the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people-group into one that supports, or does not resist, the architects’ atrocity goals. The model reveals policy interventions that prevent the social evolution of genocide among the population. The model is then extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in a Moore neighborhood. Key concepts of the analyses are applied to the onset and spread of genocide during the Holocaust (1933-1945) and to the prevention of genocide in Cote d'Ivoire (2011).

Keywords: Genocide; social evolution; peacekeeping; aggression; Holocaust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Open access 24 months after original publication.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epc:journl:v:10:y:2015:i:2:p:5-20

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