Economics of intolerance and social conflict

Partha Gangopadhyay

Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2009, vol. 4, issue 2, 23-31

Abstract: An important consensus today is that intolerance and social conflict have a substantial economic dimension. This article models a person’s “returns” to acts of intolerance in terms of social approval or disapproval that this person’s peer-group may offer. It is found that high levels of intolerance may persist, that is, society is “in equilibrium,” even as this imposes economic costs.

Keywords: Intolerance; social conflict; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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