Extending the Power of the European Commission under the EU Institutional System Following the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

Alexandru Volacu

Europolity – Continuity and Change in European Governance - Old Series, 2009, vol. 3, issue 4, 51-56

Abstract: In this article I conduct an institutional analysis on the balance of power existent in the EU, both before the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty and after. I study the new decisional mechanisms as provided by the treaty, and try to determine the changes in the interactions between institutions, as well as possible consequences of these interactions with regard to the distribution of power among the three legislative institutions of the EU.

Keywords: Lisbon Treaty; institutional system; European Commission; Council of the European Union; European Parliament; balance of power; codecision; voting procedure; qualified majority; unanimity; blocking minority; Joannina compromise; power distribution; legislative procedure; decisional mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epl:eplold:y:2009:v:3:i:4:p:51-56

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