The Role of Ownership’s Concentration Moderating Dividend Policy Effects on Firm Value
Kurniasih Dwi Astuti,
Meutia Meutia and
International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), 2020, vol. VIII, issue 2, 126-135
Purpose: The main aim of this research is to examine the role of ownership’s concentration moderating of dividend policy effects on firm value. Design/methodology/approach: For the empirical part we have used a sample of 23 companies with five years of observation a total of 115 data observations. The retrieval of data observations in the sample was based on certain criteria in the period of 2014-2018. Findings: The result supported the hypothesis that dividend policy had a positive effect on firm value. Besides, the concentration of ownership weakened the relationship between the dividend policy and the firm value. Results proved that companies in Indonesia whose ownership had been owned by families would affect management policies, such as dividend policy. Practical Implications: Therefore, the concerns of business ethics in Indonesia had been weak. It was supporting the allegation that law enforcement in Indonesia was weak. Originality/value: The Novelty of testing the concentration of ownership as a moderating variable.
Keywords: Firm value; dividends policy; ownership concentration. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H21 J54 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ers:ijebaa:v:viii:y:2020:i:2:p:126-135
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