The Impact of Structural and Contractual Arrangements on a Vertically Separated Railway
Luisa Affuso and
David M Newbery ()
Additional contact information
Luisa Affuso: London Business School
The Economic and Social Review, 2002, vol. 33, issue 1, 83-92
The unbundling of railways in Britain has been heavily criticised as undermining the passenger rail system. Economic theory suggests that structural separation and short-lived contracts hinder incentives to invest in relation-specific assets. This paper consitutes an initial investigation of this proposition. It investigates whether the investment pattern of the rail passenger franchisees responds to structural and contractual characteristics using a unique panel of data on the privatised railways in Britain. Its findings suggest that unbundling and competition for franchises combined with commercial objectives can provide strong incentives towards better performance, as is the case for investment behaviour.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.esr.ie/vOL33_1Affuso.pdf First version, 2002 (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eso:journl:v:33:y:2002:i:1:p:83-92
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in The Economic and Social Review from Economic and Social Studies
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martina Lawless ().