Economics at your fingertips  

Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest

Matthew Cole (), Ivan Pastine and Tuvana Pastine
Additional contact information
Ivan Pastine: University College Dublin
Tuvana Pastine: National University of Ireland, Maynooth

The Economic and Social Review, 2018, vol. 49, issue 4, 419-436

Abstract: In a campaign spending contest framework, we investigate the potency of frequently cited sources of incumbency advantage in generating the observed patterns of campaign expenditure and reelection rates. Since one Dollar of extra spending should not change a certain loser to a certain winner, we extend the literature by allowing the electoral benefit of visibility to be stochastic. The model provides an explanation of earlier empirical findings that district variation in the cost of visibility does not influence incumbents’ victory probability. Furthermore, in contrast to previous literature, the model predicts that campaign finance legislation can increase challengers’ expected payoffs.

Keywords: incumbency; campaign spending; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Economic and Social Review from Economic and Social Studies
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Aedin Doris ().

Page updated 2022-10-24
Handle: RePEc:eso:journl:v:49:y:2018:i:4:p:419-436