Optimization of the Competitive Model of the Government and Tax payer under the condition of the possible Existence of Error in Auditing the Tax payers Income tax Report

Hamidreza Navidi and Akbar Ranjbar
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Hamidreza Navidi: Faculty Member of Shahed University- Iran
Akbar Ranjbar: M.S Shahed University

Iranian Economic Review (IER), 2008, vol. 13, issue 1, 137-149

Abstract: In the present paper we have analyzed an important problem in the field of game theory, which is faced more frequently in the issues of income tax and has not been paid attention by scientific resources. The problem in question is the affect of taxpayer's unintentional error on optimum auditing strategy. One of the important problems in today's tax organizations is the presence of taxpayers’ unintentional error in their future income calculation and anticipation of their own economic activities for reporting on income tax statement. These errors will affect the optimum control and inspection strategy of net overall taxes. In the presented model in this paper, we have tried to consider the problem in specific condition in which the outcome results are very interesting.

Keywords: Unintentional error; Optimum auditing, auditing strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eut:journl:v:13:y:2008:i:1:p:137

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