An Experimental Study of Incentive Reversal in Sequential and Simultaneous Games

Omolbanin Jalali (), Zahra Nasrollahi () and Madjid Hatefi Madjumerd ()
Additional contact information
Omolbanin Jalali: Faculty of Economics Management and Accounting, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.
Zahra Nasrollahi: Faculty of Economics Management and Accounting, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.
Madjid Hatefi Madjumerd: Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Iranian Economic Review (IER), 2019, vol. 23, issue 3, 639-658

Abstract: It is commonly held that increasing monetary rewards enhance work effort. This study, however, argues that this will not ineludibly occur in team activities. Incentive Reversal may occur in sequential team productions featuring positive external impacts on agents. This seemingly paradoxical event is explained through two experiments in this article. The first experiment involves a sample of 182 college students who were paired in groups each playing 12 games that led to 2,184 observations. The second experiment involves a sample of 210 college students who were grouped into teams of three that involved 420 observations. The results of both experiments confirmed the occurrence of incentive reversals despite increasing monetary rewards.

Keywords: Incentive Reversal; Game Theory; Team Production; Experimental Economics; Behavioral Economy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://80.66.179.253/eut/journl/20193-5.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eut:journl:v:23:y:2019:i:3:p:639

Access Statistics for this article

Iranian Economic Review (IER) is currently edited by Dr.Hossien Abbasinejad

More articles in Iranian Economic Review (IER) from Faculty of Economics,University of Tehran.Tehran,Iran Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by [z.rahimalipour] ().