I contratti di programma: una questione di multitask?

Rosanna Nistic?

ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, 2009, vol. 36, issue 1, 93-121

Abstract: "Contratti di programma": a matter of multitask? - In the light of the results from a wide empirical investigation, this essay examines some crucial characteristics of the Italian policy measure called Contratti di programma through both the analytical framework of the incomplete contracts literature and the multi-task Principal-Agent theory. The Contratti di programma policy is based on a formal agreement between the Italian Government and private firms to carry on an investment programme comprising a number of different projects (industrial investments; workers training programs; research centres and projects). The essay also provides a number of suggestions for improving the effectiveness of this policy. Keywords: multitask, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, industrial policy Parole chiave: multitask, informazione asimmetrica, contratti incompleti, contratti di programma, politica industriale Jel Classification: D82; D86; L14; L52

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista. ... 617&Tipo=ArticoloPDF (text/html)
Single articles can be downloaded buying download credits, for info: https://www.francoangeli.it/DownloadCredit

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/poli2009-001007

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.francoang ... io.aspx?IDRivista=13

Access Statistics for this article

ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE is currently edited by FrancoAngeli

More articles in ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE from FrancoAngeli Editore
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Rosato ().