Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni?s Quest for Contractual Settlements

Nicola Giocoli

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, 2025, vol. 2025/1, issue 1, 59-79

Abstract: The paper explores Maffeo Pantaleoni?s 1898 essay, focusing on his analysis of why rational agents enter mutualistic agreements, i.e. contracts, despite common predatory and parasitic behaviors. Pantaleoni classifies social relationships into predatory, parasitic, and mutualistic categories, anticipating the zero-sum logic where wealth is redistributed rather than created. The paper highlights the limitations of Pantaleoni?s neglect of the legal system in shaping contracts, contrasting his ideas with legal realism, which emphasizes law?s role in reducing transaction costs. It also connects Pantaleoni?s work with John Rogers Commons?s theory, extending his ideas into modern institutional economics.

JEL-codes: B13 K10 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista. ... 779&Tipo=ArticoloPDF (text/html)
Single articles can be downloaded buying download credits, for info: https://www.francoangeli.it/DownloadCredit

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fan:spespe:v:html10.3280/spe2025-001004

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.francoang ... o.aspx?IDRivista=121

Access Statistics for this article

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY is currently edited by FrancoAngeli

More articles in HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY from FrancoAngeli Editore
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Rosato ().