Oligopoli simmetrici e oligoli asimmetrici
Massimo De Francesco () and
Neri Salvadori ()
STUDI ECONOMICI, 2010, vol. LXV, issue 100, 65-89
In this work we are concerned with static price games played by a given number of capacity- constrained firms producing a homogeneous commodity. The focus is mainly on capacity configurations in which either all firms are equal or all are so except a larger one and such that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. We show that in the former case the symmetrical solution is the unique equilibrium whereas in the latter a number of asymmetrical equilibria may also exist.
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista. ... 386&Tipo=ArticoloPDF (text/html)
Single articles can be downloaded buying download credits, for info: https://www.francoangeli.it/DownloadCredit
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/ste2010-100005
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.francoang ... io.aspx?IDRivista=59
Access Statistics for this article
STUDI ECONOMICI is currently edited by FrancoAngeli
More articles in STUDI ECONOMICI from FrancoAngeli Editore
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Rosato ().