New Measure of Voting Power

Frantisek Turnovec ()

Czech Economic Review, 2007, vol. 1, issue 1, 04-14

Abstract: During last two decades we observe a boom of power indices literature related to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Growing interest to power indices methodology leads also to reconsideration of the methodology itself. In this paper a new general a priori voting power measure is proposed distinguishing between absolute and relative power. This power measure covers traditional Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf power indices as its special cases.

Keywords: absolute power; cooperative games; decisive situation; I-power; pivot; power indices; P-power; relative power; swing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: New Measure of Voting Power (2005)
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