Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games

Lina Mallozzi () and Stef Tijs ()
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Lina Mallozzi: University of Naples Federico II, Department of Mathematics and Applications, Naples, Italy
Stef Tijs: University of Tilburg, CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg, The Netherlands

Czech Economic Review, 2012, vol. 6, issue 1, 5-13

Abstract: We deal with n-person normal form games where a subset of players decide to cooperate (signatories) and choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition members as in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) context. The non-cooperating (non-signatories) players choose their strategies as a Nash equilibrium. In this paper the partial cooperative equilibrium (PCE) under the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg assumptions are considered and presented also in the case of non-signatories multiple decision. Some properties are discussed in both situations, particularly the profit of the players are compared.

Keywords: Partial cooperation; Stackelberg assumption; Nash-Cournot assumption; Stackelberg leader’s value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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