Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure

Federica Briata (), Marco Dall’Aglio () and Vito Fragnelli ()
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Federica Briata: University of Genova, Department of Mathematics, Genova, Italy
Marco Dall’Aglio: LUISS University, Department of Economics and Finance, Roma, Italy

Czech Economic Review, 2012, vol. 6, issue 3, 199-208

Abstract: In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

Keywords: Fairness; Knaster’s procedure; complete risk aversion; dynamic coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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