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The New ECB Governing Council Voting-Modalities Scheme: An Outside View

Petr Procházka

Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), 2004, vol. 54, issue 3-4, 117-137

Abstract: With the accession of 10 new European Union member states in May 2004, much attention is being placed on the governance of European Community institutions. This article focuses specifically on discussions of European Central Bank (ECB) governance, particularly as regards the ECB?s amendment of voting modalities in the ECB?s governing council. The article first discusses the potential conflict between the political and economic weight of individual member states in the ECB?s monetary-decision-making process. It discusses both the complexity of the decision-making process in the current model, and compares existing models in different countries. The article then describes the new voting modalities scheme and analyzes the related pro and con arguments. While much criticism has been levied on the new voting system, the consensus reached by the EU after almost two years of discussion was an important achievement. On the other hand, the rather hectic timing of the reform?s adoption, with a deadline prior to EU enlargement, has sent a mixed signal to the accession candidates, which have been excluded fro its designing.

Keywords: monetary-decision-making process; ECB governance; voting modalities; enabling clause (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 F15 F33 F36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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