Shareholder Democracy in the Czech Republic (in Czech)

Jiøí Havel ()
Additional contact information
Jiøí Havel: Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), 2005, vol. 55, issue 9-10, 441-459

Abstract: Joint-stock companies are among the most fundamental components of a market economy. “Voucher privatization” in the Czech Republic saw an abrupt mushrooming of joint-stock companies where none had appeared for over a generation. This occurred in an environment lacking in guiding institutional frameworks, offering only minimal protection for both minority and majority shareholders, which handicapped the country’s capital-market development. Beginning in 1996, several improvements of the institutional framework were implemented. Now Czech commercial law is largely harmonized with European standards. Weaknesses still persist in enforcement, however, and as such, both foreign and domestic investors prefer simpler forms of organization to limited-liability companies.

Keywords: corruption; evolution; institutions; joint-stock company; legal framework; privatization; transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 G28 K11 K42 O17 P21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/storage/1031_s_441_459.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:fauart:v:55:y:2005:i:9-10:p:441-459

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver) from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Natalie Svarcova ().