Political Pressure on Central Banks: The Case of the Czech National Bank (in English)

Adam Gersl

Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), 2006, vol. 56, issue 1-2, 18-39

Abstract: As the independence of national central banks in the European Union is one of the main institutional features of the EU’s monetary constitution, this paper considers whether central-bank monetary policy is conducted independently or if it is affected by political pressure. Specifically, the author applies Thomas Havrilesky’s methodology to measure political pressure on the Czech National Bank in testing whether taken monetary policy was influenced by outside pressure.

Keywords: monetary policy; pressure groups; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:fauart:v:56:y:2006:i:1-2:p:18-39

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