Country Creditor Rights, Information Sharing, and Commercial Banks’ Profitability

Borja Amor-Tapia (), María T. Tascón () and José L. Fanluj ()
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Borja Amor-Tapia: Universidad de León, http://www.unileon.es/
María T. Tascón: Universidad de León, http://www.unileon.es/
José L. Fanluj: Universidad de León, http://www.unileon.es/

Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), 2010, vol. 60, issue 4, 336-354

Abstract: The authors analyze commercial banks’ profitability (return on equity, ROE) at different levels of creditor rights and an aggregate score of information sharing in terms of credit bureaus. After controlling for bank size and some macroeconomic variables, the results indicate that profitability is higher and more persistent when creditors are well protected. Furthermore, the presence of a (public or private) credit bureau increases the persistence of ROE, but higher levels of information sharing foster competition and erode future profitability.

Keywords: return on equity (ROE); commercial banks; creditor rights; information sharing; predictive ability of accounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 G21 G28 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:fauart:v:60:y:2010:i:4:p:336-354

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