Experimental Games and Climate Coalitions

Alessandro Tavoni ()

Review of Environment, Energy and Economics - Re3, 2014

Abstract: How can games be used to solve the climae stalemate? In this short interview Alessandro Tavoni, research fellow at the Grantham Research Institute of the LSE and associate researcher at FEEM, gives practical examples on how experimental games can be integrated into more traditional lines of research on coalition formation and stability.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femre3:2014.11-03

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