Screening contracts when institutions matter: an example

Eugenia Kazamaki Ottersten
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Eugenia Kazamaki Ottersten: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Sweden

Finnish Economic Papers, 1998, vol. 11, issue 2, 110-116

Abstract: Based on the notion of affiliation a model is developed which suggests that laws which restrict the firm's flexibility to adjust its employment force resume in higher requirements on potential employees. The paper demonstrates the interaction between the legal structures and individual firm's decision making, herein hiring practices.

JEL-codes: D44 D81 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fep:journl:v:11:y:1998:i:2:p:110-116

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