A Note on Local Public Investment and Debt Limitation in a Federation*

Alfons Weichenrieder

Finnish Economic Papers, 2009, vol. 22, issue 1, 3-8

Abstract: The paper considers the local provision of public infrastructure in symmetric jurisdictions when population is mobile. It shows that an inflexible deficit limitation may result in too little local public investment if the population is mobile. Conversely, given the existence of migration externalities, implementing Musgrave’s pay as you use finance, according to which new debt should match net investment, can lead to optimal local investment.

JEL-codes: H54 H74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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