An n-person bargaining game

Klaus Kultti ()

Finnish Economic Papers, 1994, vol. 7, issue 2, 130-132

Abstract: Rubinstein type bargaining is extended to n-person case with linear utilities. The game possesses a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which evelybody's share is equal as impatience goes to zero.

JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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