Estratégias de poder e atores desprovidos de recursos

Gérard Ouimet

RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, 2003, vol. 43, issue 1

Abstract: The power games – or political abilities – used by successful leaders has been studied by a myriad of authors. Devoted to this issue, several monographs and scientific and professional articles explain in great detail how powerful organizational leaders used to produce even more power, and thus, they encourage their employees to exceed themselves in order to achieve the company goals. On the other hand, very few studies have evaluated the possible existence of power games for organizational actors lacking resources. What does individuals having little power do to evolve and progress in the company hierarchical structure? Does it exist power games for actors that are not very powerful and for specific organizational situations? This article wants to be an attempt to conceptualize a typology of power games exploited by actors having limited ways of actualization.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rae/article/view/37354 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:eaerae:v:43:y:2003:i:1:a:37354

Access Statistics for this article

RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas is currently edited by Eduardo Diniz

More articles in RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas from FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Núcleo de Computação da FGV EPGE ().