Endividamento em firmas com alta propensão à expropriação: o caso de firmas com um controlador

Rodrigo Oliveira Soares and Gilberto de Oliveira Kloeckner

RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, 2008, vol. 48, issue 4

Abstract: The Brazilian capital market is characterized by concentrated ownership structures, in a legal environment which is propitious to the expropriation of minority shareholders, what may influence the incentives to decision makers, and mainly, affect the decision on debt as a financing source. We aimed to study the leverage of firms controlled by a single shareholder, which we classify as high propension to minority expropriation firms. The sample consisted of 322 company traded at Bovespa between 1996 and 2002. Tests results showed that the firms controlled by a single shareholder used a smaller amount of debt, what is consistent with the high monitoring capacity of debtholders. Conversely, the level of debt increases as the cash flow rights of the controller shareholder decreases, what may be a signal of the use of debt as a governance device.

Date: 2008
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