Incentivos governamentais em PPP: uma análise por opções reais

Luiz Eduardo Teixeira Brandão, Carlos de Lamare Bastian Pinto, Leonardo Lima Gomes and Marina Schuabb Salgado

RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, 2012, vol. 52, issue 1

Abstract: On November 2005 the State Government of São Paulo, Brazil, announced the intention to bid a contract to provide passenger services for the Line 4 of the São Paulo Metropolitan Subway System. In this article we use the real options approach to analyze the effect of the government guarantees provided in the contract on the value and the risk of the project, as well as the cost and the risk of these guarantees to the government. The results indicate that the incentives proposed are effective in reducing the risk and increase the net value of the Project by 36% at a cost to the State of only 5% of the total value of the project. Additionally, we show that for a given cost to the government, the most effective risk reduction mechanisms are the ones that include a higher portion of demand guarantees in relation to the investment subsidy.

Date: 2012
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