Efeitos da vinculação de conselheiros ao acordo de acionistas no valor da firma

Marina Gelman, Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro and Valentin Seidler

RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, 2015, vol. 55, issue 3

Abstract: This study analyzes the effect of shareholders’ agreement binding provisions on firm value. Using a database of 181 publicly listed firms from the special segments of the BM&FBovespa, between 2008 and 2012, we analyze the effect of the inclusion of generic and specific clauses into the shareholder agreement bind director’s vote to the agreement on firm value. The results indicate a negative effect of the shareholders’ agreement on firm value. This effect is higher in the presence of generic clauses and lower in the presence of specific clauses, even after controlling for the endogeneity of the shareholders’ decision to adopt shareholder agreements. The results allow us to conclude that controlling shareholders use the shareholder agreements as a mechanism to enhance control at the expense of firm value (entrenchment effect). This article contributes to the literature on governance and corporate finance to reveal practices that weaken the role of one of the main pillars of governance, the board of directors.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rae/article/view/49255 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:eaerae:v:55:y:2015:i:3:a:49255

Access Statistics for this article

RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas is currently edited by Eduardo Diniz

More articles in RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas from FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Núcleo de Computação da FGV EPGE ().