A note on auctions with compulsory partnership

Paulo Monteiro, Aloisio Araujo, Otávio Damé and Clara Costellini

Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, 2016, vol. 70, issue 4

Abstract: We study a symmetric, profitt share, common value auction witha twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to entera partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue atrate (say) 0 < r < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium inpure strategies.

Date: 2016
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