Crime and punishment in classroom: a game-theoretic approach for student cheating

Marcelo de Carvalho Griebeler

Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, 2017, vol. 71, issue 1

Abstract: We provide the microeconomic foundations of cheating in classroom through a static game with complete information. Our setting is composed by two students, who must choose whether or not to cheat, and a professor, who must choose how much effort to exert in trying to catch dishonest students. Our findings support the determinants of cheating found by the empirical literature, mainly those related to the penalty's level. It is also emphasized the importance of professors being well-motivated (with low disutility of effort) and worried about fairness in classroom. The two extensions of the baseline model reinforce the importance of the cost-benefit analysis to understand dishonest behavior in classroom.

Date: 2017
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