Do voters reward politicians for education expenditures?

Fernanda Estevan and Matheus Assunção

Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, 2022, vol. 76, issue 1

Abstract: Since education is publicly provided in most countries, the political system typically determines the level of education expenditures. Thus, it is essential to understand politicians' incentives to allocate resources to education. This paper provides causal evidence that voters reward politicians for educational expenditures by estimating the impact of a change in public education spending on mayors' reelection chances. To do so, we use an exogenous source of variation in education expenditures brought about by a federal reform, FUNDEF, in Brazil. We show that increases in education expenditures caused by FUNDEF led to a significant increase in the mayors' chances of reelection. A one percent increase in per capita education expenditures due to FUNDEF led to a 1.45 percent increase in mayors' chances of reelection.

Date: 2022
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