EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How Much Do Guarantees and Bailouts Cost the Government?

Deborah Lucas

Policy Hub, 2024, vol. 2024, issue 3, 29

Abstract: Governments in advanced economies absorb a large and growing share of aggregate credit risk. That exposure arises from explicit and implicit contingent liabilities such as the ones that culminated in bailouts during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and from loan guarantees extended during the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the growth of credit policy as a crisis response tool and substitute for traditional fiscal assistance, governments continue to underreport the associated costs and risks. More comprehensive and timely cost estimates, produced using a fair value framework, would increase transparency and discourage overreliance on these policies. Such cost estimates for the GFC bailouts and Covid-19 pandemic guarantee programs reveal costs that were an order of magnitude lower than the risk exposures those policies entailed but nevertheless were large enough to call into question whether less expensive and less risky policy alternatives could have achieved the same goals.

Keywords: international lender of last resort; Federal Reserve; financial crises; eurodollar (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 F33 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/documents/resea ... -cost-government.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:a00068:99096

DOI: 10.29338/ph2024-03

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Policy Hub from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Robert Sarwark ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:fip:a00068:99096