 Treasury auctions: what do the recent models and results tell us?Saikat Nandi Economic Review, 1997, vol. 82, issue Q 4, 4-15 Abstract: Auctions, as selling mechanisms, have existed for well over two thousand years. Today, one of the most important auction markets in the world is that of U.S. Treasury securities; approximately $2 trillion worth of Treasury securities was auctioned in 1995. ; A long-standing debate has been about selecting an appropriate auction format for various Treasury securities, a format that would be least subject to possible manipulation by individual traders or a cartel and also result in the highest possible revenues for the Treasury. The Treasury is currently experimenting with what is called a uniform-price format for auctioning two- and five-year Treasury notes. A similar mechanism might be put into broader use. ; This article explains Treasury auctions in light of recent theoretical research and related empirical evidence. Empirically there seems to be no discernible difference between discriminatory and uniform-price auctions in terms of revenue to the Treasury. The author concludes that the proposal to switch to electronic ascending-price open-outcry auctions with an implied uniform price may be worthy of more consideration. Keywords: Auctions; Financial markets; Treasury notes (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedaer:y:1997:i:q4:p:4-15:n:v.82no.4 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article More articles in Economic Review from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC. |
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