Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?

Geoffrey Tootell

New England Economic Review, 1991, issue Sep, 3-12

Abstract: It is widely believed that the Federal Open Market Committee policy votes of Federal Reserve Bank presidents are more \"conservative\" than those of their Board governor counterparts. In both academia and Congress, the suspicion runs deep that the political appointment procedure exercised over Federal Reserve Board governors-nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate-results in monetary policy that is more concerned with output and less concerned with inflation than the policy produced by the more politically independent District Bank presidents. ; This article examines the data to determine whether it supports this conventional wisdom. The statistical techniques used in this paper permit a test of the hypothesis necessary to support their conclusions. The evidence rejects the conclusion that significant differences exist.

Keywords: Federal Open Market Committee; Federal Reserve System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neer/neer1991/neer591a.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedbne:y:1991:i:sep:p:3-12

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in New England Economic Review from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Spozio ().