EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The discount rate: the other tool of monetary policy

Stephen K. McNees

New England Economic Review, 1993, issue Jul, 3-22

Abstract: Although open market operations are clearly the primary monetary policy tool, the discount rate is not without influence. Federal Reserve Banks propose any discount rate changes, and the Board of Governors decides whether to accept, reject, or take no action on their requests. This article examines the involvement and influence of the various Reserve Banks in this process, exploring their participation over a 20-year period. The historical analysis shows that Reserve Banks differ in the frequency, persistence, and direction of their proposals for change. ; The article also develops statistical models for the decision procedures of the Reserve Banks in proposing a change and for the Boards rulings on those proposals. Both pay particular attention to labor markets, financial markets, and inflation or monetary aggregates. Results also show that the number of Reserve Bank proposals before the Board does play an independent role in the Boards decisions, above and beyond national economic conditions.

Keywords: Discount; Monetary policy - United States (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neer/neer1993/neer493a.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedbne:y:1993:i:jul:p:3-22

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in New England Economic Review from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Spozio ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-15
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbne:y:1993:i:jul:p:3-22