Theories of interjurisdictional competition

Daphne A. Kenyon

New England Economic Review, 1997, issue Mar, 13-36

Abstract: What behavior can be expected from state and local governments, given market-analogy theories of intergovernmental competition (competition enhances efficiency) and game-theoretic models (competition is destructive)? How does the real world depart from these paradigms? What empirical hypotheses do they imply concerning the effectiveness of alternative competitive public policies? Paper: Daphne A. Kenyon Discussion: Caroline M. Hoxby, Andrew Reschovsky

Keywords: state; finances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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