GATT and the new protectionism

David Gould and William Gruben

Economic and Financial Policy Review, 1994, issue Q III, 29-42

Abstract: The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the first agreement of its kind that reduces or eliminates tariffs on many goods and addresses issues related to intellectual property rights, trade in services and agricultural subsidies. With good reason, it has generated much optimism about the future of free world trade. ; But does GATT's trade liberalization today mean that trade will remain liberalized tomorrow? Increasingly, governments are counteracting the perceived unfair trade practices of other nations with their own trade barriers. While concerns about fairness are legitimate, raising trade barriers to counteract actual or perceived unfair trade practices of others is another form of protectionism that restricts world trade. This new protectionism has most often taken the form of antidumping and countervailing duties. ; Because the use of antidumping and countervailing duties has grown dramatically in recent years across many countries, David Gould and William Gruben analyze whether the recent changes to the GATT accord will discourage the most protectionist aspects of these widely used trade barriers. Gould and Gruben find that while the new GATT agreement does not eliminate the ability of such countries to misuse antidumping and countervailing duties, the accord delineates the rules of such duties much more clearly and provides mechanisms that will likely limit their abuse.

Keywords: International; trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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