Terrorism, Trade, and Welfare

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler and Javed Younas ()

Review, 2017, vol. 99, issue 3, 295-306

Abstract: For a standard competitive trade model, the authors show that the incidence of terrorism in different nations can affect the pattern of trade. Nations with a greater incidence of terrorism will export goods that are more immune to terrorism-related disruptions, while importing more terrorism-impacted goods. In addition, terrorism can be welfare augmenting for some nations because of terms-of-trade externalities. Finally, the authors present some qualitative conditions that identify when a nation?s trade volume may rise (or fall) in response to a greater incidence of terrorism. Given the differential impact across nations, these trade and welfare results point to potential difficulties in international coordination of counterterrorism policy.

JEL-codes: F11 F52 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.20955/r.2017.295-306 https://doi.org/10.20955/r.2017.295-306 (text/html)
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publicat ... rade-and-welfare.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlrv:00086

DOI: 10.20955/r.2017.295-306

Access Statistics for this article

Review is currently edited by Juan M. Sanchez

More articles in Review from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Scott St. Louis ().