Political economy determinants of non-agricultural trade policy
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay () and
Suryadipta Roy ()
Review, 2011, issue Mar, No v. 93, no. 2, 89-104
The authors investigate several existing political economy hypotheses on trade policy using cross-country trade-protection data for non-agricultural goods. The authors find that a left-leaning political regime leads to pro-labor trade policies only for a subset of trade policy measures. In addition, they find that income inequality and country-level corruption appear to be important determinants of trade policy. For various measures of trade protection, it appears that corruption tends to hurt labor interests by increasing trade protection in labor-abundant countries and reducing trade protection in capital-abundant countries. This finding suggests that corruption, among other factors, may move trade policy away from the desires of the median voter.
Keywords: International trade; Corruption; Tariff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publicat ... 104Bandyopadhyay.pdf (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2011:i:mar:p:89-104:n:v.93no.2
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://files.stloui ... htdocs/publications/
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Review from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anna Oates ().