The labor market implications of unemployment insurance and short-term compensation

Randall Wright

Quarterly Review, 1991, vol. 15, issue Sum, 19 pages

Abstract: Two types of unemployment insurance systems are studied. In one, unemployed workers receive benefits while those on reduced hours do not, as in North America (at least until recently). In the other, short-time compensation is paid to workers on reduced hours, as in Europe. With incomplete experience-rating of unemployment insurance taxes, the first system leads to inefficient temporary layoffs. The latter system does not lead to layoffs but does lead to inefficient hours per worker. Some cross-country evidence is presented regarding these effects. The implication of the analysis is that policy reform on the tax, not the benefit, side of the system is the best way to reduce the inefficiencies implied by both types of unemployment insurance.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Labor market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr1532.pdf (application/pdf)
http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr1532.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1991:i:sum:p:11-19:n:v.15no.3

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Quarterly Review from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kate Hansel ().