Designing effective auctions for treasury securities
Leonardo Bartolini and
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 1997, issue jul
Most discussions of treasury auction design focus on the choice between two methods for issuing securities--uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Although auction theory and much recent research appear to favor the uniform-price method, most countries conduct their treasury auctions using the discriminatory format. What are the main issues underlying the debate over effective auction design?
Keywords: Auctions; Government securities; Treasury bills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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