Designing effective auctions for treasury securities

Leonardo Bartolini and Carlo Cottarelli

Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 1997, vol. 3, issue Jul

Abstract: Most discussions of treasury auction design focus on the choice between two methods for issuing securities--uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Although auction theory and much recent research appear to favor the uniform-price method, most countries conduct their treasury auctions using the discriminatory format. What are the main issues underlying the debate over effective auction design?

Keywords: Auctions; Government securities; Treasury bills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/leo.pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci3_9.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednci:y:1997:i:jul:n:v.3no.9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Current Issues in Economics and Finance from Federal Reserve Bank of New York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gabriella Bucciarelli ().