The Treasury auction process: objectives, structure, and recent acquisitions

Kenneth Garbade and Jeffrey F. Ingber

Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 2005, vol. 11, issue Feb

Abstract: Treasury auctions are designed to minimize the cost of financing the national debt by promoting broad, competitive bidding and liquid secondary market trading. A review of the auction process-from the announcement of a new issue to the delivery of securities-reveals how these objectives have been met. Also highlighted are changes in the auction process that stem from recent advances in information-processing technologies and risk management techniques.

Keywords: Government securities; Treasury bills; Auctions; Treasury notes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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